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SUMMARY  
 
This chapter deals with the regulatory and institutional issues associated with the 
management of systemic risk and the concept of macroprudential supervision. From a 
methodological viewpoint, it relies upon a multi-level governance (MLG) approach, 
considering the domestic, regional, and international dimensions of systemic risk 
control. 
                                                 
* I would like to thank Enmanuel Cedeño-Brea for excellent, comprehensive and original 
research assistance and Charles Goodhart, David Bholat and Andromachi Georgosouli for 
helpful comments and suggestions. Errors or limitations of judgment are mine alone.  
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The chapter commences with a brief introduction outlining why macroprudential 
supervision has become so topical. Three additional sections follow. The second 
section considers the ‘paradigm shift’ in the management of systemic risk following 
the 2007-09 global financial crisis and the drivers behind the changes adopted. The 
third section addresses the trend towards macroprudential supervision and considers 
the definition of macroprudential policy, comparing its goals and objectives with 
those of other economic policies. It also presents some of the instruments that are 
generally included in the macroprudential policy toolkit. Though some of the 
instruments are relatively new, some other tools (perhaps with a different name and 
for a different policy objective) were applied in the past.1 The fourth and final section 
discusses some of the institutional challenges for creating arrangements at the 
international, regional and domestic levels. It also covers some of the main legal and 
institutional issues that need to be taken into account in order to develop sound and 
robust institutional arrangements for macroprudential supervision across regions and 
jurisdictions.  
                                                 
1 See generally Bholat, D, ‘Macro-prudential Policy: Historical Precedents and Possible Legal 
Pitfalls’ (2013) available at http://www.lccge.bbk.ac.uk/news/seminar.  
I. INTRODUCTION  
 
The 2007-09 global financial crisis challenged many pre-existing conceptions about 
systemic risk. One of these is the so-called ‘composition fallacy’2 which contends that 
the safety and soundness of any financial system is the aggregate soundness of all its 
participating institutions.3 This fallacy assumed that if individual entities were robust, 
than the whole system would be resilient. This assumption proved to be misguided. 
Using an analogy with forest management, the safeguard of the health of the forest 
requires a different type of strategy than the safeguard of the health of each individual 
tree.  Ecological considerations would also warn us against excessive reliance on a 
‘static’ notion of stability; as Andromachi Georgosouli has pointed out4, the notion of 
                                                 
2 Brunnermeier, M et. al., The Fundamental Principles of Financial Regulation, Centre for 
Economic Policy Research (CEPR) and International Center for Monetary and Banking 
Studies (ICMB), Geneva Reports on the World Economy 11 (June, 2009) 15. 
3  Osiński J, Seal, K, and Hoogduin, L, ‘Macroprudential and Microprudential Policies: 
Toward Cohabitation’ (21 June 2013) International Monetary Fund (IMF), Monetary and 
Capital Markets Department, 6.  
4Andromachi Georgosouli, in an unpublished manuscript entitled ‘Financial Resilience’ (cited 
with the permission of the author) addresses the problem of financial vulnerability shifting 
away from the financial stability metaphor towards a resilience-oriented scheme of regulation. 
She defines financial resilience as ‘adaptive capacity to change’, which ‘is measured in terms 
of one’s ability to learn, prepare and, where appropriate, cope and recover from future 
contingencies’.  She concludes: ‘Compared to stability-focused regimes, resilience regulation 
is more consonant to the logic of a capitalist economy. This is because it focuses on the 
transition of the financial system from one state of being to the next rather than on the 
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systemic risk control requires an understanding of resilience as adaptability, thus a 
dynamic consideration.5 
 
Systemic risks pose a threat to financial stability. And, as the crisis evidenced, these 
types of risks are not confined to the banking system: they can also affect securities 
and derivatives markets. Such was the case of international insurer, AIG, and 
investment banks such as Lehman Brothers and Bear Stearns. During the economic 
meltdown, systemic risks stemmed from non-bank institutions and from financial 
instruments that traditionally fell outside the regulatory perimeter. Furthermore, 
systemic risks are not bounded by jurisdictional frontiers; they have a tendency to 
spread across geographical borders. The dichotomy between global markets and 
institutions and national law and national policies is particularly acute in the 
management of systemic risk and in the design of adequate institutional solutions to 
deal with its negative spillover effects. The financial crisis signified an inflection 
point towards the adoption of a macro-prudential approach to financial supervision. 
                                                                                                                                           
system’s resistance and its capacity to bounce back to a perceived normality. While financial 
stability calls for policies that focus on the magnitude and level of contingency of 
destabilising episodes, financial resilience calls for policies that focus on the socio--structural 
implications of destabilising episodes irrespective of their magnitude and degree of 
contingency at a given point in time. Contrary to financial stability-driven systems of 
regulation, “resilience regulation” gives equal consideration to consumer resilience and 
systemic resilience and thus it is more likely to lead to more equitable management of 
financial vulnerability’. Her departure from the ‘financial stability-centred view’ that 
currently prevails in the literature provides a fresh approach to the current debate on the 
subject:  Georgosouli, Andromachi, ‘Financial Resilience’ (2012) unpublished manuscript. 
5 cf Taleb, N, Antifragile: Things That Gain From Disorder (2012). 
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II. SYSTEMIC RISK IN THE AFTERMATH OF THE 
CRISIS 
 
The onslaught of the financial crisis has triggered a change in the way that financial 
supervisors tackle systemic risk. Some commentators argue that an economic 
downturn was unnecessary in order to understand the global interconnectedness and 
complexity of financial markets, participants and transactions. 6  Nevertheless, the 
meltdown has underscored that systemic risk can have both a national and a 
transnational impact because of: ‘the inherent risks posed by large, multinational, 
interconnected financial institutions’.7  
 
Hal Scott defines systemic risk as ‘the risk that a national, or the global, financial 
system will break down’.8  Systemic risk poses a threat to financial stability. Financial 
instability can have a knock-on effect on the real economy, sclerotizing growth. There 
is no consensus on the definition of financial stability.9 Instead it is construed as an 
                                                 
6 Golden, J, ‘The Courts, the Financial Crisis and Systemic Risk’ (2009) 4 Capital Markets 
Law Journal S141-S149. 
7  Greene E, et al., ‘A Closer Look at “Too Big to Fail”: National and International 
Approaches to Addressing the Risks of Large, Interconnected Financial Institutions’ (2010) 5 
(2) Capital Market Law Journal 117-140, 118.  
8 Scott, H, ‘Reducing Systemic Risk Through the Reform of Capital Regulation’ (2010) 13 
(3) Journal of International Economic Law 763–778, 763. 
9 In the so-called ‘Ingves Report’, the Bank for International Settlements (BIS) set out to 
establish a definition of financial stability that would assist in its operational implementation. 
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elusive and evolving concept.10 However, it is agreed that it ‘has become a common 
concern in the process of globalization as it is so directly linked with economic 
prosperity and human welfare’.11  
 
The absence of a clear-cut definition of financial stability entails that the ‘notion of 
financial stability is often discussed in terms of the concept of systemic risk and its 
sources’. 12  Systemic risk management—and consequently, macroprudential 
supervision—aims to contain the ‘build-up of systemic vulnerabilities over time’.13 
The accumulation of such vulnerabilities can provoke a generalized reduction in asset 
values within a financial system. Crises of this nature can be termed financial or 
capital crises —as opposed to the notion of liquidity or banking crises.14 Financial 
crises imply widespread asset write-downs and write-offs in the balance sheets of 
financial and non-financial institutions across one or more jurisdictions. These asset 
devaluations stem from the systemic vulnerabilities that generate financial instability.  
 
                                                                                                                                           
The report presents at least five different definitions of financial stability found in the recent 
literature: BIS, Central Bank Governance and Financial Stability (2011), 32.  
10 Lastra, R, Legal Foundations of International Monetary Stability (2006).  
11  Weber, R, ‘Multilayered Governance in International Financial Regulation and 
Supervision’ (2010) 13 (3) Journal of International Economic Law, 695. 
12 Galati G, and Moessner, R, ‘Macroprudential Policy – a Literature Review’ (February 
2011), BIS Working Papers No. 337, available at: http://www.bis.org/publ/work337.pdf, 13. 
13 International Monetary Fund (IMF), Key Aspects of Macroprudential Policy (2013),  7.  
14 Lastra, R and Wood, G, ‘The Crisis of 2007-2009: Nature, Causes and Reactions’, (2010) 
13(3) Journal of International Economic Law, 534. 
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The renewed interest in systemic risk that resulted after the financial crisis has 
underlined the importance of Frank Knight´s classic distinction between risk and 
uncertainty 15 in relation to the informational asymmetries faced by market 
participants, regulators and supervisors.16 While the notion of ‘risk proper’ entails a 
quantity susceptible of measurement, Knightian uncertainty involves unquantifiable 
risk. Considerations regarding systemic risk should question the measurability of 
prospect scenarios. In particular, the contemporary definitions of systemic risk might 
conflate quantifiable contingencies and immeasurable ones.  
 
Moreover, systemic risk has been categorized into two different time-based 
dimensions. Firstly, the structural dimension of systemic risk refers to the ‘the 
distribution of risks across the financial sector’. 17  This is a static or snapshot 
dimension, which considers the aggregate risk in any (set of) financial system(s) at a 
given point in time. On the other hand, there is a cyclical dimension that tracks the 
dynamic changes of systemic risk over time.18 The cyclical dimension looks at how 
risk varies over the economic cycle—that is, during booms and slumps, from peak to 
                                                 
15 Knight, F, Risk, Uncertainty and Profit (1921).  
16 See Avgouleas, E, Governance of Global Financial Markets: The Law, the Economics and 
the Politics (2012) 104.  
17 European Systemic Risk Board (ESRB), Recommendation of the European Systemic Risk 
Board on Intermediate Objectives and Instruments of Macroprudential Policy, ESRB/2013/1 
2013/C170/01 (2013).  
18 Elliott, D, et al., ‘The History of Cyclical Macroprudential Policy in the United States’, 
Finance and Economics Discussion Series Divisions of Research & Statistics and Monetary 
Affairs WP No. 2013-29 (2013). 
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trough. This distinction is useful for identifying which instruments from the 
macroprudential toolkit are fit for each time-dimension of systemic risk.19  
 
1. Financial Stability as a Global Public Good 
 
The interconnectedness of financial markets has rendered financial stability as a 
‘national, regional and international goal’.20 This makes it a global public good21 that 
‘does not stop at national borders’.22 The public good nature of financial stability 
means that it is a potential source of market failure. Global financial stability 
combines the two elements of public goods: non-rivalry and non-exclusivity.23  The 
non-rivalrous nature of financial stability means that its enjoyment by one jurisdiction 
will not reduce the amount available to another country. While its non-exclusive 
characteristic means that jurisdictions that invest heavily to attain it cannot exclude 
other states from enjoying some of its benefits. Conversely, the absence of stability-
financial instability-can be symmetrically construed as a global public bad, which also 
shares the features of lacking rivalry and exclusion.  
 
                                                 
19 However, the ESRB considers that: ‘it is difficult to make a clear-cut distinction between 
the two dimensions given their close interlinkages’: ESRB, n 17 above.  
20 Lastra, R, ‘Systemic Risk, SIFIs and Financial Stability’ (2011) 6 (2) Capital Markets Law 
Journal, 198, 207. 
21  Trachtman, J, ‘The International Law of Financial Crisis: Spillovers, Subsidiarity, 
Fragmentation and Cooperation’ (2010) 13 (3) Journal of International Economic Law 721. 
22 Schoenmaker, D, ‘A New Financial Stability Framework for Europe’ (2008) 13(3) The 
Financial Regulator. 
23 Miceli, T, The Economic Approach to Law (2004), 32. 
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As with other public goods, public authorities are entrusted with the provision of 
financial stability. Some countries could have incentives to under-invest in achieving 
financial stability in order to free-ride on the investments made by other jurisdictions. 
This can lead to the potential underproduction of financial stability at a cross-border 
basis.24  
 
2. Moral Hazard and ‘Too-big-to’ Problems 
 
The ‘too-big-to’ (TBT) set of problems (too-big-to-fail, too-complex-to-fail, too-
interconnected-to-fail…) can be considered as an additional driver behind the latest 
shift in the supervisory paradigm. These TBT considerations, fuelled by moral hazard 
and implicit guarantees, posed and continue to pose a significant threat to global 
financial and economic stability. In addition, many countries harbour institutions that 
they cannot afford to bail out in the hypothetical case of their failure (too-big-to-save 
or TBTS).25 These entities are not only commercial banks. The AIG bailout and the 
                                                 
24 Trachman, n 21 above.  
25 Countries harbored these institutions both as home and as host States. The distinction 
between home/host states is relevant for the regulation and supervision of financial 
institutions and conglomerates. Many financial entities operate on a cross-border basis, while 
supervision and crisis management largely remain national tasks. Charles Goodhart and Rosa 
M. Lastra refer to this as the ‘cross border problem’: cf. Goodhart, C, and Lastra, R, ‘Border 
Problems’ (2010) 13(3) Journal of International Economic Law 705. Jay Lawrence 
Westbrook has also argued that bailing out SIFIs could even be financially troubling for more 
affluent jurisdictions like the US and the UK: Westbrook, J, ‘SIFIs and States’, (2013) 49 (2) 
Texas International Law Journal. 
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collapse of Lehman Brothers revealed that problems, crises or failures in nonbank 
institutions could also have systemic dimensions.   
 
These eventualities gave renewed impetus to the challenge of developing a 
supervisory framework for dealing with the moral hazard posed by Systemically 
Important Financial Institutions (SIFIs).26 The G20s Financial Stability Board (FSB) 
defined SIFIs as ‘financial institutions whose distress or disorderly failure, because of 
their size, complexity and systemic interconnectedness, would cause significant 
disruption to the wider financial system and economic activity’.27 SIFIs that pose a 
threat to global financial stability are referred to as global or G-SIFIs. On November 
2011, the FSB issued an initial list of 29 G-SIFIs.28 Moreover, on July 2013, the FSB 
published a list of Global Systemically Important Insurers (G-SIIs) and the policy 
measures that will apply to them.29 
 
                                                 
26 cf Financial Stability Board (FSB), Reducing the Moral Hazard Posed by Systemically 
Important Financial Institutions, (2010) Available at 
<http://www.financialstabilityboard.org/publications/r_101111a.pdf>. 
27  cf FSB, Policy Measures to Address Systemically Important Financial Institutions (4 
November 2011) available at: 
<http://www.financialstabilityboard.org/publications/r_111104bb.pdf>. 
28 ibid, Annex (the irony being that the FSB’s designation of certain institutions as SIFIs may 
create the very problem it is trying to mitigate). 
29 FSB, Global Systemically Important Insurers (G-SIIs) and the Policy Measures that will 
Apply to Them (18 July 2013) available at: 
<http://www.financialstabilityboard.org/publications/r_130718.pdf>.  
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SIFIs and G-SIFIs resemble the baobab trees depicted in Antoine de Saint-Exupéry´s 
classic book, ‘The Little Prince’. In the book’s illustration the baobabs (inspired by 
the Adansonia genus of trees) are stifling and smothering the planet with the size of 
their roots and trunks. Like the baobabs, G-SIFIs have extended their nexus of 
activities across the globe, entrenching their roots across many jurisdictions.30  
 
The supervisory challenge posed by SIFIs is not exclusive to developed countries. 
There are many jurisdictions that host G-SIFIs. Many other countries have to deal 
with their own set of SIFIs. This reality prompted the BCBS to issue its Framework 
for Dealing with Domestic Systemically Important Banks or D-SIBs.31 The FSB also 
published its report on extending the G-SIFI Framework to D-SIBs. 32  This 
underscores the idea that G-SIFIs and D-SIBs represent two complementary sides of 
the systemic risk problematic.  
 
                                                 
30  cf Lastra, R, ‘Inaugural Lecture: the Quest for International Financial Regulation’ (23 
March 2011) Queen Mary University London, available at: 
<http://www.law.qmul.ac.uk/events/podcasts/lastra2011/>.  
31 Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, A Framework for Dealing With Systemically 
Important Banks (11 October 2012) available at: http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs233.htm. .  
32 FSB, G-SIFI Framework to Domestic Systemically Important Banks: Progress Report to G-
20 Ministers and Governors (16 April 2012). Available at: 
<http://www.financialstabilityboard.org/publications/r_120420b.pdf>.  
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III. MACROPRUDENTIAL SUPERVISION   
1. Definition and Evolution  
 
Before the crisis, risk-based supervision was mostly concerned with the safety and 
soundness of individual institutions (the concept of micro-prudential supervision).33 
After the crisis, the focus has shifted towards the robustness of the whole financial 
system. For example, the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS) 
enhanced the scope of risk-based supervision in its Core Principles for Effective 
Banking Supervision. The new Core Principles have been widened in order to include: 
‘the need for greater intensity and resources to deal effectively with systemically 
important banks; the importance of applying a system-wide, macro perspective to the 
microprudential supervision of banks to assist in identifying, analysing and taking 
pre-emptive action to address systemic risk; and the increasing focus on effective 
crisis management, recovery and resolution measures in reducing both the probability 
and impact of a bank failure’. 34  This system wide perspective is referred to as 
macroprudential supervision. The set of measures, tools and processes that financial 
regulators employ in order to achieve the aforementioned objectives is referred to as 
‘macroprudential policy’.  
 
‛Macroprudential’ policy has become one of the main features of the post-crisis 
                                                 
33  See Lastra, R, ‘Defining Forward-looking Judgment-based Supervision’ (2013) 14 (3) 
Journal of Banking Regulation 221-227. 
34  Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, Core Principles for Effective Banking 
Supervision, (2012),  2. See also ibid Core Principles 8 and 9. 
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financial regulatory reform agenda.35 Although a relatively recent phenomenon, it has 
already sparked many academic papers, high-level discussions and policy reports. 
This progress notwithstanding, macroprudential policy is still considered to be in its 
initial phase. Douglas Elliott considers that ‘(w)e are in the early days of 
macroprudential policy, akin perhaps to where monetary policy stood in the 1950s’.36 
 
The macroprudential perspective can be a murky concept to grasp, somewhere in 
between micro-prudential supervision and monetary policy. The contours are not 
always easy to demarcate. The European Systemic Risk Board (ESRB) states that: 
‘(t)he ultimate objective of macro-prudential policy is to contribute to the safeguard 
of the stability of the financial system as a whole, including by strengthening the 
resilience of the financial system and decreasing the build-up of systemic risks, 
thereby ensuring a sustainable contribution of the financial sector to economic 
growth’.37 Before the macroprudential paradigm shift, ‘the broader financial system 
was steered by a combination of monetary policy and microprudential regulation’.38 
With the onslaught of the crisis, the focus has now expanded to take into account the 
                                                 
35 Galati and Moessner, n 12 above.  
36 Elliott, D, ‘Macroprudential Policy: Time to Start Experimenting’ The Economist, 4 June 
2013. A similar view has been stated by Haldane, A, ‘Macroprudential Policies-When and 
How to Use Them’ (2013) available at: 
<http://www.imf.org/external/np/seminars/eng/2013/macro2/pdf/ah.pdf>.  
37 ESRB, n 17 above, Art. 1. 
38 Schoenmaker, D and Wierts, P, ‘Macroprudential Policy: The Need for a Coherent Policy 
Framework’ (2011) DSF Policy Paper Series Paper No. 13, 2.  
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bigger picture: the safety and soundness of the whole financial system as well as the 
global interconnectedness of systems and infrastructures across borders.  
 
In order to conceptually clarify macroprudential supervision better, it can be useful to 
rely on the analogy provided by forest management: ‘Macro-prudential supervision is 
analogous to the oversight of the forest, whereas micro-prudential supervision is 
analogous to the oversight of individual trees’. 39  This illustration can resonate 
powerfully when considering that in order to preserve the forest, some individual trees 
might need to be sacrificed—or overseen with higher concern.   
 
Macroprudential policy looks to provide a backstop for systemic risk containment 
within the perimeter of individual institutions. It must not be confused with forms of 
microprudential management, like consolidated supervision. In the latter, the focus is 
on the related entities within a financial group. While macroprudential supervision is 
concerned with the relationship between any individual institution (or financial group) 
and the safety and soundness of the system as a whole.  
 
One of the major challenges of implementing systemic-wide supervision is adequate 
policy interaction between macroprudential policy and other economic policies. 
Additional levels of complexity arise when considering that micro and 
macroprudential supervision are not only limited to the commercial banking sector—
but span across other financial subsectors (insurance, investment banking, shadow 
banking) on a domestic and transnational level.  
 
                                                 
39 Lastra, n 20 above, 198. 
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2. The Macroprudencial Policy Toolkit 
 
The range of macroprudential regulation and supervision is broader than the 
traditional scope of microprudential regulation. As a result, the macroprudential 
toolkit includes a plethora of instruments. Some of these tools—like transaction taxes 
and central counterparty clearing (CCP)40—are not even ‘prudential’ in nature. Others 
are recognizable. These devices have been borrowed from other areas of economic 
policy, such as: monetary, fiscal, competition policies and crisis management.41 This 
highlights the fact that even though the macroprudential perspective is fairly recent, 
the toolkit drawn so far comprises many familiar instruments from other policy 
areas.42  
 
The macroprudential policy menu needs to encompass tools for the whole financial 
system—including areas that fall outside the perimeter of the regulatory radar. The 
shadow banking sector, market infrastructures, market participants and financial 
                                                 
40  Central counterparty (CCP) clearing refers to the interposition of the CCP between 
counterparties of the original trade thus, the CCP becoming buyer to the seller and seller to 
the buyer. This process of replacing the original contract with two equal and opposite 
transactions is referred to as ‘novation’ where the resulting two transactions are completely 
independent from each other. See generally Norman, P, The Risk Controllers: Central 
Counterparty Clearing in Globalised Financial Markets, (2011). 
41 IMF, n 13 above, 8. 
42 This could add confusion regarding the boundaries of macroprudential policy vis-à-vis 
other economic policy fields.  
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instruments can all pose a significant systemic threat to domestic and transnational 
financial stability.43  
 
The instruments also need to be effective and efficient. The ESRB states that 
effectiveness refers to how well each instrument mitigates systemic market failures 
while achieving its policy objective(s).44 While the efficiency of any macroprudential 
tool has been defined as achieving the desired goals and objectives at a minimum 
cost. However, because macroprudential supervision is still in its initial 
implementation phase, the instruments will need adequate testing and calibration.   
 
One of the main challenges in the design of an effective policy is the assessment and 
calibration of the various instruments in the macroprudential toolkit. This calibration 
implies not only using the instruments effectively and efficiently. It also means 
balancing countervailing tools for different economic policy objectives. Moreover, the 
regulatory dialectic cycle suggests that financial innovation and ‘loophole mining’ 
can create new sources of systemic risk build-up that will have to be addressed.45  
                                                 
43 The FSB has defined the ‘shadow banking system’ or ‘market-based’ financing system as 
‘credit intermediation involving entities and activities (fully or partially) outside the regular 
banking system or non-bank credit intermediation in short’: FSB, Strengthening Oversight 
and Regulation of Shadow Banking Policy Framework for Strengthening Oversight and 
Regulation of Shadow Banking Entities (29 August 2013) available at: 
http://www.financialstabilityboard.org/publications/r_130829c.pdf.  
44 ESRB, n 17 above. 
45  Kane, E, ‘Accelerating Inflation, Technological Innovation, and the Decreasing 
Effectiveness of Banking Regulation’ (1981) 36 (2) Journal of Finance..cf: Kane, E  ‘The 
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Downturns in the economic cycle are also likely to stir tensions between macro and 
microprudential policies. This means that the calibration of macroprudential tools is 
contingent to the overall economic cycle. Countercyclical46  capital buffers are an 
example of this.  This instrument consists of requiring financial institutions to set 
aside more capital during good times, in order to better withstand potential economic 
downturns. 
 
3. Macroprudential Tools and Objectives 
 
Macroprudential tools may be divided using the categories of systemic risk referred to 
earlier in the chapter, distinguishing between: cyclical and structural macroprudential 
tools.47 Elliot et. al. have argued that in some cases, countries like the USA have long 
been using some of the identified instruments without having labelled them as 
‘macroprudential’.48  
 
                                                                                                                                           
inevitability of Shadow Banking’, (2012)  available at: 
http://www.frbatlanta.org/documents/news/conferences/12fmc/12fmc_kane.pdf.. 
46 cf 49, below.  
47 Schoenmaker and Wierts, n 38  above, 2.  
48 Elliott et. al., n 18 above, 3. David Bholat of the Bank of England is conducting a similar 
type of research in the UK: Bholat, D, ‘Macro-prudential Policy: Historical Precedents and 
Possible Future Pitfalls’ (25 October 2013) Lecture at Birkbeck, University of London, 
London, UK. 
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Given the relative short history of macroprudential supervision as such (even if 
instruments in the toolkit have been used for decades before) the framework for using 
it in the pursuit of the financial stability objective is largely experimental, and relies to 
a large extent on ‘work in progress’. Many leading financial regulatory trendsetters, 
like the Financial Stability Board (FSB) and the International Monetary Fund (IMF), 
and domestic and regional macroprudential supervisors, like the Bank of England 
(BoE) and the ESRB, have set out to establish an adequate framework for measuring 
and making macroprudential policy operational.  
 
A working paper written by IMF staff states that the macroprudential toolkit must 
contain three categories of instruments:  
 
(i) Instruments constructed to have an impact on the pro-cyclicality49 of the 
financial system (e.g., countercyclical capital buffers) or on the contribution 
of a financial institution to systemic risk (e.g., Systemically Important 
Financial Institution surcharges); (b) Prudential instruments to address a 
build-up of systemic risk in specific segments of the market (such as loan-
to-value ratios) and instruments aimed at constraining general or specific 
                                                 
49  ‘Procyclical’ tools move together with the economic cycle. This means that they are 
directly or positively related to economic booms and busts. Conversely, ‘counter-cyclical’  
tools and policies are negatively-or inversely- related with the economic cycle. The story of 
Joseph (present in the Bible and the Quran) serves as a good illustration in order to explain 
the concept of counter-cyclicality. As a countercyclical policy, Joseph recommended saving 
resources during seven years of economic prosperity in Egypt in order to endure the 
subsequent seven years of scarcity and famine.  
 19 
leverage in nonfinancial sectors (such as debt-to-income ratios); and (iii) 
Tools to address systemic liquidity concerns.50 
 
The ESRB has set out a set five intermediate objectives that macroprudential policy 
should aim to achieve. These intermediate objectives are:  
 
(1) Mitigating and preventing excessive credit growth and leverage; (2) 
Mitigating and preventing excessive maturity mismatch and market 
illiquidity; (3) Limit direct and indirect exposure concentrations; (4) 
Limit the systemic impact of misaligned incentives with a view to 
reducing moral hazard; and (5) Strengthening the resilience of financial 
infrastructures.51 
 
The aforementioned intermediate objectives are seen as transitional steps towards 
achieving robust financial stability. The ESRB considers that: ‘identifying 
intermediate objectives makes macro-prudential policy more operational, transparent 
and accountable and provides an economic basis for the selection of instruments’.52  
 
Table 1 summarizes and presents the referred intermediate objectives and includes 
the matching policy instruments that have been identified by the ESRB – an indicative 
list comprising different categories – in order to tackle specific market failures that 
lead to financial instability. The ESRB recommends that instruments should be 
                                                 
50 Osinski, Seal and Hoogduin, n 3 above, 25. 
51 ESRB, n 17 above.   
52 ibid, paragraph 4.  
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selected according to their efficiency and effectiveness. However, because of the 
incipient implementation of these devices on a systemic-wide scale, there is still 
limited evidence to evaluate their success or failure. 
 
TABLE 1 
Macroprudential Policy Intermediate Objectives, Selected  
Instruments and Market Failure 
Source: ESRB53 
 
Intermediate Objective 
 
 
Underlying Market Failure 
(identified by the ESRB) 
 
Selected Instruments 
 
Mitigate and prevent 
excessive credit growth and 
leverage 
 
 
 Credit crunch 
externalities: a sudden 
tightening of the 
conditions required to 
obtain a loan, resulting in 
a reduction of the 
availability of credit to 
the non-financial sector. 
 Endogenous risk-taking: 
incentives that during a 
boom generate excessive 
risk-taking and, in the 
case of banks, a 
 
 Countercyclical capital 
buffer  
 Sectorial capital 
requirements (including 
intra-financial system)  
 Macro-prudential 
leverage ratio  
 Loan-to-value 
requirements (LTV)  
 Loan-to-income/debt 
(service)-to-income 
requirements (LTI) 
                                                 
53 ESRB, n 17 above.  
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deterioration of lending 
standards. Explanations 
for this include signalling 
competence, market 
pressures to boost 
returns, or strategic 
interaction between 
institutions. 
 Risk illusion: collective 
underestimation of risk 
related to short-term 
memory and the 
infrequency of financial 
crises. 
 Bank runs: the 
withdrawal of wholesale 
or retail funding in case 
of actual or perceived 
insolvency. 
 Interconnectedness 
externalities: contagious 
consequences of 
uncertainty about events 
at an institution or within 
a market. 
 
Mitigate and prevent 
 
 Fire sales externalities: 
 
 Macro-prudential 
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excessive maturity mismatch 
and market illiquidity 
 
arise from the forced sale 
of assets due to excessive 
asset and liability 
mismatches. This may 
lead to a liquidity spiral 
whereby falling asset 
prices induce further 
sales, deleveraging and 
spillovers to financial 
institutions with similar 
asset classes. 
 Bank runs. 
 Market illiquidity: the 
drying-up of interbank or 
capital markets resulting 
from a general loss of 
confidence or very 
pessimistic expectations. 
adjustment to liquidity 
ratio (e.g. liquidity 
coverage ratio)   
 Macro-prudential 
restrictions on funding 
sources (e.g. net stable 
funding ratio)  
  Macro-prudential 
unweighted limit to less 
stable funding (e.g. loan-
to-deposit ratio)  
 Margin and haircut 
requirements 
 
Limit direct and indirect 
exposure concentrations 
 
 Interconnectedness 
externalities. 
 Fire sales externalities: 
(here) arise from the 
forced sale of assets at a 
dislocated price given the 
distribution of exposures 
within the financial 
 
 Large exposure 
restrictions  
 CCP clearing 
requirement 
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system. 
 
Limit the systemic impact of 
misaligned incentives with a 
view to reducing moral 
hazard 
 
 Moral hazard and ‘too 
big to fail’: excessive 
risk-taking due to 
expectations of a bailout 
due to the perceived 
system relevance of an 
individual institution. 
 
 SIFI capital surcharges 
 
Strengthen the resilience of 
financial infrastructures 
 
 
 Interconnectedness 
externalities  
 Fire sales externalities  
 Risk illusion 
 Incomplete contracts: 
compensation structures 
that provide incentives 
for risky behaviour. 
 
 Margin and haircut 
requirements on CCP 
clearing  
 Increased disclosure  
 Structural systemic risk 
buffer 
 
 
To sum up, some of the main tools identified with macroprudential policy and 
supervision are: 
 
 Countercyclical capital buffers (CCB)  
 Sectorial capital requirements. This would include capital requirements for 
banking, securities intermediation and insurance.  
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 Macro-prudential leverage ratio. For all entities across sector, not just commercial 
banks.54  
 Loan-to-value requirements (LTV). LTV ratios represent the proportion between 
the value of a secured loan in comparison to the value of an asset used as security 
for said loan (i.e. the value of a mortgage in comparison to the value of the 
mortgaged asset). LTV ratios aim to reduce the exposure of lenders but they also 
tackle moral hazard on the borrowers’ side, making them hold more ‘skin-in-the-
game’ in order to create a disincentive for defaulting.  
 Loan-to-income/debt (service)-to-income requirements (LTI). The LTI ratio 
measures a borrower´s repayment capacity. It compares the borrower´s scheduled 
debt service payments with his/her income. If payments represent a large portion 
(or exceed) the borrowers income, default might ensue.  
 Macro-prudential adjustment to liquidity ratio (e.g. liquidity coverage ratio)   
 Macro-prudential restrictions on funding sources (e.g. net stable funding ratio)  
  Macro-prudential unweighted limit to less stable funding (e.g. loan-to-deposit 
ratio)  
 Margin and haircut requirements55 
 SIFI capital surcharges. This means requiring more stringent capital requirements 
to SIFIs 
 Margin and haircut requirements on CCP clearing  
                                                 
54  Hal Scott remarks on how leading up to the crisis many US investment banks where 
overleveraged reaching leverage to capital ratios of 30 to 1. Scott, n 8 above, 765. 
55 In his comments to this chapter, Charles Goodhart pointed out that he found the dividing 
lines rather restrictive in that margin requirements, for example, could be used as an 
instrument for almost all the intermediate objectives.  
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 Increased disclosure  
 Structural systemic risk buffer 
 Large exposure restrictions 
 CCP clearing requirements 
 Deposit protection/ insurance 
 
Additional instruments proposed by the IMF, include ‘Pigovian’ fiscal measures, such 
as the Financial Stability Contribution (FSC), aimed at providing funds for an 
effective resolution mechanism, and a Financial Activities Tax (FAT), ‘levied on the 
sum of the profits and remuneration of financial institutions, and paid to general 
revenue’.56 In addition, competition policy measures - such as limits against sectorial 
concentration and merger control - can also be used with macroprudential objectives. 
These macroprudential tools can generate conflicting tensions with the goals 
traditionally associated with other overlapping economic policies. Consequently, 
trade-offs can exist between macroprudential policy and other economic programmes.  
 
The IMF has also identified (in house and externally) two additional set of tools 
aimed at addressing the interconnectedness dimension of cross-sectional systemic 
risk. These set of tools are (i) network analysis and (ii) price-based measures.57 By 
interconnectedness, the IMF staffs refer to the ‘complex webs of contract 
relationships across financial institutions’.58  
                                                 
56 IMF, A Fair and Substantial Contribution by the Financial Sector (2010). 
57 Arregui, N, et. al. ‘Addressing Interconnectedness: Concepts and Prudential Tools’ (2013) 
IMF Working Paper WP/13/199, 6.   
58 ibid, 4.  
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Network analysis consists of looking at the nexus of existing multilateral claims 
(links) between financial institutions (nodes).  The main tools for network analysis 
identified by IMF staff are: 1) centrality analysis, 2) cluster analysis and 3) balance 
sheet simulation measures. 59  Centrality analysis looks at the existing patterns of 
linkages between nodes (financial institutions) to understand which of them are 
crucial to a particular financial system.60 Cluster analysis compiles nodes that are 
closer to each other into subsets or ‘clusters’ with the aim of identifying vulnerable 
entities and ‘gatekeepers’ that can spread risk to other institutions. Balance sheet 
simulations are hypothetical assessments that assume financial failure in order to test 
how well institutional balance sheets perform.   
 
On the other hand, price-based measures are defined as: ‘methodologies developed 
for the measurement of risk in portfolios of securities [that] have been adapted to the 
measurement of systemic risk for a “portfolio” of institutions’.61 One of the main 
distinctions between network analyses and price-based measures is that while the 
former tackle ‘direct bilateral exposures between institutions’, price based measures 
can also cover ‘indirect spillover channels’ across institutions.62 These tools involve 
sophisticated quantitative techniques.  
                                                 
59 ibid. 
60  See Markose, S, ‘Systemic Risk Analytics: A Data Driven Multi-Agent Financial 
Network (MAFN) Approach’ (2013) 14 (3) Journal of Banking Regulation. 
61 ibid, 7. 
62 ibid, 10. 
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Some of the main price-based measures that have been identified in the emerging 
literature include: CoVaR, distress spillovers, return spillovers, JPoD and CoPoD.63 
CoVaR is ‘the value at risk (VaR) of the financial system conditional on institutions 
being in distress’.64 While VaR measures the individual risk of financial institutions, 
CoVar aims to study how the risk of one institution affects another. 65  Return 
spillovers aim to gauge the contribution of one institution to systemic risk. While 
distress spillovers are an indicator of the systemic contribution of individual 
institutions, but during distressful times.66 Moreover, Segoviano and Goodhart have 
developed a measure for calculating the conditional probabilities of distress 
(“CoPoD”) that estimates the probability that one institution experiences financial 
instability conditional on the distress of another entity. The joint probability of 
distress (“JPoD”) can also be calculated for multiple institutions.67  
 
IV. INSTITUTIONAL ARRANGEMENTS FOR 
MACROPRUDENTIAL SUPERVISION 
 
                                                 
63 These measures are explained with great detail in the Appendix III of Arregui et. al., n 57 
above, 51-53. 
64 Adrian, T, and Brunnermeier, M, ‘CoVaR’ (2011) Federal Reserve Bank of New York 
Staff Reports No. 348.  
65 idem  
66 see Chan-Lau, J, Mitra, S, and Ong, L, ‘Identifying Contagion Risk in the International 
Banking System: An Extreme Value Theory Approach’ (2012) International Journal of 
Finance and Economics, 17. 
 
67 See Goodhart, C, and Segoviano, M, ‘Banking Stability Measures’ (2009) IMF Working 
Paper No. WP/09/04.  
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The IMF has stated that in order to be effective, macroprudential policies require a 
‘strong institutional framework’. 68  Because of the cross-border implications that 
systemic risks pose to global financial stability, the institutional arrangements need to 
cover the international, regional and national dimensions. The IMF calls this the 
multilateral aspects of macroprudential policy.69 These dimensions justify the need 
for strong coordination and cooperation in the implementation of macroprudential 
policies as well as in cross-border systemic-wide financial supervision and orderly 
bank resolution schemes for G-SIFIs and D-SIBs. In turn, the main institutional 
arrangements that have been originated in the international and domestic perspectives 
are discussed.  
 
1. The International Perspective 
 
In November 2010, the G20 leaders called on the top financial regulatory standard 
setters to develop the macroprudential frameworks, requiring that ‘these frameworks 
should take into account national and regional arrangements’. 70  This statement 
evidences the importance of building sound regional and national institutional and 
policy structures for macroprudential supervision. The main forums leading these 
reforms at the global level are the FSB, the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision 
(BCBS) and the IMF. 
                                                 
68 IMF, n 13 above, 27.   
69 ibid, p. 5. 
70 FSB, IMF and BIS, Macroprudential Policy Tools and Frameworks: Progress Report to 
G20 (2011).  
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It still might be too early to adequately assess the effectiveness of these forums in 
paving the way towards systemic-wide supervision. The FSB is the newest —and 
probably—the least well known of these forums.71 Its membership includes central 
banks, finance ministries and also other international standard setters and international 
organisations, like the IMF, the IOSCO and the BCBS.72 Although its decisions are 
based on consensus, the limited participation of many emerging economies in its 
decision making process could undermine the effectiveness of its scope of influence. 
This can also give rise to democratic legitimacy concerns. Nonetheless, the FSB has 
led the way in the policy debate of important systemic policy areas, which include: 
SIFIs, GSIIs, Shadow banking73, TBTF74 and information gaps.75 
The IMF has also become an important player in the macroprudential trend. The Fund 
has stated that it ‘can play a key role, through its bilateral and multilateral surveillance 
                                                 
71 See Schembri, L,  ‘Born of Necessity and Built to Succeed: Why Canada and the World 
Need the Financial Stability Board’, speech by the Deputy Governor of the Bank of Canada 
(24 September 2013). 
72 The full list is available at: http://www.financialstabilityboard.org/about/fsb_members.htm..  
73 See FSB, n 43 above.   
74 See FSB, Progress and Next Steps Towards Ending ‘Too-Big-To-Fail’ (2 September 2013)  
available at: http://www.financialstabilityboard.org/publications/r_130902.htm.  
75 The data gap initiative (DGI) is a ‘common data template for global systemically important 
banks to address key information gaps and to provide the authorities with a strong framework 
for globally assessing potential systemic risks’: FSB and IMF, The Financial Crisis and 
Information Gaps: Fourth Progress Report on the Implementation of the G-20 Data Gaps 
Initiative (September 2013) available at: 
http://www.financialstabilityboard.org/publications/r_131014.pdf. 
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and in collaboration with standard setters and country authorities, to help ensure the 
effective use of macroprudential policy for domestic and global stability’.76 Although 
its scope has been traditionally focused purely on microprudential banking tools, the 
BCBS has also taken important steps in the transition towards a systemic wide 
approach to supervision. As mentioned before, the BCBS has widened the scope of its 
Core Principles and also developed ruled for supervising D-SIBs. 
 
2. Regional and Domestic Perspectives 
 
Many high-level policy reports and academic papers address the key features that 
should underpin a robust domestic institutional structure for macroprudential 
supervision.77 There is no one size fits all solution when it comes to adopting a 
macroprudential institutional arrangement. While some discussions exist regarding 
which institutions are better fitted to perform macroprudential oversight, there is some 
consensus on recommending that every country should build on its existing 
institutional framework, attending to its own country-specific circumstances.78 Thus, 
emerging market economies should implement bespoke institutional frameworks that 
conform to their existing institutional conditions. 
 
In a joint policy document, the IMF, the FSB and the BIS have stated that the main 
features for a robust institutional macroprudential arrangements should include:  (i) a 
                                                 
76 IMF, n 13 above, 5.  
77 See IMF, n 13 above. cf ESRB, n 17 above.  
78 FSB, IMF and BIS, n 70 above, 17. 
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clear legal mandate; (ii) appropriate powers and instruments; (iii) suitable 
accountability and transparency mechanisms; (iv) composition of the decision-making 
body; and (v) arrangements for domestic policy coordination.79 In addition, the IMF 
has identified at least three models for establishing a robust institutional framework. 
Table 2 provides a summary of these models. The ideal model will depend on the 
legal and historical features of each country.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 TABLE 2 
Models for Macroprudential Institutional Arrangement 
Source: IMF80 
 
Model 1. Central bank. 
 
Macroprudential responsibilities are entrusted directly to 
the Central Bank (with the same governing body in 
charge of monetary policy and macro-prudential 
supervision) 
 
Model 2. Internal body 
within the central bank. 
Macroprudential responsibilities are assigned to a 
committee within the Central Bank which is separate 
from the committee entrusted with the conduct of 
                                                 
79 ibid, 15. 
80 IMF, n 13 above, 30. 
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monetary policy. 
Model 3. External 
committee outside of the 
central bank. 
The macroprudential functions are assigned to an 
institution outside of the Central Bank, with the 
participation of the latter and other institutions involved 
with systemic risk monitoring 
 
 
The first model assigns macroprudential oversight to the central bank or monetary 
authority. The idea is that central bankers should lead in order to better coordinate 
monetary policy and other goals—like price stability—alongside the overarching 
systemic wide goal of financial stability. The shortcoming from this arrangement is 
that countervailing policy objectives and instruments could generate frictions. Some 
studies have pointed out the existence of possible tensions between macroprudential 
and monetary policies.81 
 
The second model – a variation of the first – suggests an institutional arrangement 
that assigns macroprudential policy to a committee within the central bank separate 
from the committee entrusted with the conduct of monetary policy. This structure can 
offer the possibility of segregating macroprudential goals from other policy 
objectives. This is for example the model adopted in the UK with the establishment of 
                                                 
81 See Maddaloni, A, and Peydró J, ‘Monetary Policy, Macroprudential Policy and Banking 
Stability: Evidence from the Euro Area’ (2013) European Central Bank Macroprudential 
Research Network, Working Paper Series No. 1560, 25. cf Angelini, P, et. al., ‘Monetary and 
Macroprudential Policies’ (2012) European Central Bank Macroprudential Research 
Network, Working Paper Series No. 1449, 25. 
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the Financial Policy Committee within the Bank of England (separate from the 
Monetary Policy Committee) by the Financial Services Act 2012. The FPC has been 
charged with the main objective of ‘of identifying, monitoring and taking action to 
remove or reduce systemic risks with a view to protecting and enhancing the 
resilience of the UK financial system’.82  
 
The IMF, the SFSB and the BIS state that: ‘the creation of such committees is most 
obviously desirable when multiple bodies have a financial stability mandate, or where 
there is separation between bodies with decision-making and policy implementation 
powers’.83 In addition, committees also offer the possibility for collective decision-
making and consensus building. Schoenmaker and Wierts point out that ‘committees 
tend to be less effective in timely decision-making’ 84  though they still favour 
committees over decision-making by a single individual.85  
 
Charles Goodhart, and also Luis Garicano and Rosa Lastra have recommended that 
the central bank should be in charge of macroprudential supervision86 As regards the 
                                                 
82 See http://www.bankofengland.co.uk/financialstability/pages/fpc/default.aspx.   
83 FSB, IMF & BIS, n 70 above, 17. 
84 Schoenmaker and Wierts, n 38 above, 9. 
85 By arguing that ‘Committee decision-making tends be more balanced than decision-making 
by individuals’: ibid, 8. 
86 Goodhart, C, ‘The Changing Role of Central Banks’ (2010) BIS Working Papers No. 326, 
30; Garicano L, and Lastra, R, ‘Towards a New Architecture for Financial Stability: Seven 
Principles’ (2010) 13(3) Journal of International Economic Law, 612.  
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specific central banking organizational arrangement, a committee structure provides 
adequate balancing of its twin mandate (monetary stability and financial stability). 
 
The third model proposes the creation of macroprudential oversight institutions 
located outside the central bank though generally with some participation by the 
central bank. This is for instance the model adopted by the Dodd-Frank Act 2010 with 
the creation of the Financial Stability Oversight Council. 87  ‘The emergence of 
councils for financial stability to undertake systemic risk control or macro-prudential 
supervision is a feature’ of on-going financial reforms.88  The Dodd-Frank Act of 
2010 gives the Financial Stability Oversight Council (FSOC) the power to entrust the 
Federal Reserve System with responsibility for the regulation of any firm that is 
deemed to be systemically according to criteria specified in the Act.  
 
In the European Union (EU), the ESRB was established, acting on the 
recommendations of the De Larosière Report bearing in mind the different 
jurisdictional domains of the EU (the domain of the ESRB) and the Eurozone (for 
which the ECB has jurisdiction).89   However, the advent of banking union risks 
making the ESRB irrelevant. 
 
                                                 
87 See http://www.treasury.gov/initiatives/fsoc/about/Pages/default.aspx. The FSOC is made 
up of ten voting members and five nonvoting members. 
88 Lastra, n 20 above, 198.  
89 High-Level Group on Financial Supervision in the EU, Report on Financial Supervision in 
the EU (De Larosière report)  (2009). 
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Banking union is a fundamental change in the institutional design for the pursuit of 
financial stability in Europe.90 The first pillar of banking union is ‘single supervision’, 
with the establishment of the Single Supervisory Mechanism (SSM). ‘Single 
supervision’ in the context of banking union means European supervision (conferred 
upon the ECB) for credit institutions of eurozone Member States and of non-eurozone 
EU Member States that choose to become part of the SSM.91 The SSM aims to ensure 
that the EU’s policy relating to prudential supervision is applied in a ‘coherent and 
effective manner’ in all member states concerned92 and provides the conditionality 
required in the ESM Treaty for banks to be able to be recapitalized.  The conferral of 
micro prudential supervisory and some macro prudential powers to the ECB (Article 
5 of the SSM regulation) deeply alters the supervisory map in Europe. 
The second pillar of banking union is ‘single resolution’, with a Single Resolution 
Mechanism (SRM)93 - which should be aligned with the EU Bank Recovery and 
                                                 
90 See Council Regulation (EU) No. 1024/2013 of 15 October 2013 conferring specific tasks on the 
European Central Bank concerning policies relating to the prudential supervision of credit institutions; 
and Regulation (EU) No 1022/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 22 October 2013 
amending Regulation (EU) No 1093/2010 establishing a European Supervisory Authority (European 
Banking Authority) as regards the conferral of specific tasks on the European Central Bank pursuant to 
Council Regulation (EU) No 1024/2013. 
91  Council Regulation (EU) No 1024/2013 of 15 October 2013 conferring specific tasks on the 
European Central Bank concerning policies relating to the prudential supervision of credit institutions. 
[2013] OJ L287/63, commonly referred to as SSM Regulation. 
92 Council Regulation (EU) No. 1024/2013 of 15 October 2013, Recital 12. See generally Lastra, R, 
‘Banking Union and Single Market: Conflict or Companionship?’ (2013) 36 (5) Fordham International 
Law Journal. 
93 The Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and the Council establishing uniform rules 
and a uniform procedure for the resolution of credit institutions and certain investment firms in the 
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Resolution Directive (BRRD) 94 - and a Single Resolution Fund. The third pillar is 
‘common deposit protection’.95  The jurisdictional area of banking union comprises 
                                                                                                                                           
framework of a Single Resolution Mechanism & a Single Bank Resolution Fund and amending 
Regulation (EU) No 1093/2010 of the European Parliament and of the Council, COM(2013) 520 final 
(SRM Regulation) was published in July 2013 (http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=COM:2013:0520:FIN:EN:PDF ).  
The political agreement was reached by the Parliament and the Council in March 2014. The final text 
of the Regulation (EU) No …/2014 of the European Parliament and the Council establishing uniform 
rules and a uniform procedure for the resolution of credit institutions and certain investment firms in 
the framework of a Single Resolution Mechanism and a Single Bank Resolution Fund and amending 
Regulation (EU) No 1093/2010 of the European Parliament and of the Council was adopted by the 
European Parliament on 15 April 2014. See http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?pubRef=-
//EP//NONSGML+AMD+A7-2013-0478+002-002+DOC+WORD+V0//EN. This is commonly 
referred to as the SRM Regulation. 
94 The BRRD was published in the OJ in June 2014. See Directive 2014/59/EU of the European 
Parliament and of the Council of 15 May 2014 establishing a framework for the recovery and 
resolution of credit institutions and investment firms and amending Council Directive 82/891/EEC, and 
Directives 2001/24/EC, 2002/47/EC, 2004/25/EC, 2005/56/EC, 2007/36/EC, 2011/35/EU, 2012/30/EU 
and 2013/36/EU, and Regulations (EU) No 1093/2010 and (EU) No 648/2012, of the European 
Parliament and of the Council, OJ L 173, 12/06/2014, p. 190–348 
95 Although a single deposit guarantee scheme shall not be established for the time being (we will 
continue to rely upon the existing networks of national deposit guarantee schemes) a new Directive on 
Deposit Guarantee Schemes repealing Directive 94/19/EC was adopted by the Council and the 
European Parliament in April 2014. Directive 2014/49/EU of the European Parliament and of the 
Council of 16 April 2014 on Deposit Guarantee Schemes (recast), not yet published in the OJ, but 
published by the Council: 
http://register.consilium.europa.eu/doc/srv?l=EN&f=PE%2082%202014%20INIT  
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the eurozone Member States and those other Member States that establish close 
cooperation arrangements.9697  
Banking union is an incomplete edifice, since lender of last resort – ‘the elephant in 
the room’ – should have been the fourth pillar, and since the arrangements for macro 
prudential supervision have become cumbersome, with the ECB, ESRB and national 
authorities involved at different levels.  
 
 
The transition towards establishing macroprudential oversight institutions has not 
been exclusive to the aforementioned leading jurisdictions. Countries like Chile, 
Mexico and Brazil have all established financial stability councils.98 Other notable 
examples include South Africa, Korea and New Zealand.99  
                                                 
96 For an analysis of the uneasy coexistence between banking union and single market see Rosa Lastra, 
“Banking Union and Single Market: Conflict or Companionship?” Fordham International Law 
Journal, Vol. Volume 36, No. 5, 2013. See also Eilis Ferran, “European Banking Union and the EU 
Single Financial Market: More Differentiated Integration, or Disintegration?” (April 18, 2014). 
University of Cambridge Faculty of Law Research Paper No. 29/2014. Available at SSRN: 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=2426580. 
97 The so-called ‘SSM framework regulation’ was subsequently adopted on 16 April 2014.  See 
Regulation (EU) No. 468/2014 of the European Central Bank of 16 April 2014, establishing the 
framework for cooperation within the Single Supervisory Mechanism between the European Central 
Bank and national competent authorities and with national designated authorities, OJ L141/1, 
14.04.2014. 
98 In Chile, the Consejo de Estabilidad Financiera was created in October 2011. In turn, 
Mexico created the Consejo de Estabilidad del Sistema Financiero (CESF). cf Lastra, R and 
Cedeno-Brea, E, ‘Latin American Financial Reforms’ (2013) working paper presented at the 
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3. Concluding Observation: Multilateral Macroprudential 
Coordination 
 
 
Financial supervision and regulation are in a state of flux, nationally, supranationally_ 
and internationally. Establishing domestic and regional institutional frameworks for 
macroprudential policy is an important first step in the pursuit of financial stability. 
However, in order to be truly effective, these frameworks require that domestic 
supervisors cooperate and coordinate their policies at an international level. 100 
Without adequate cooperation and coordination, the institutional frameworks can 
become futile, since systemic risk transcends geographic and institutional boundaries.  
A lack of collaboration could jeopardize the containment of cross-border negative 
spillovers.  
 
Inter-jurisdictional cooperation and coordination are also necessary for the 
establishment of orderly resolution mechanisms that support financial stability. Bank 
resolution regimes are relevant to macroprudential policy because the failure of an 
institution can generate financial instability across borders.101 The role of coordination 
                                                                                                                                           
92nd MOCOMILA- Committee on International Monetary Law of the International Law Association 
meeting. 
99 IMF, n 13 above, 46. 
100 Greene et. al, n 7 above,129. 
101 The two main categories for the SRR (Special Resolution Regime) are the single point of entry 
(SPE) and the multiple point of entry (MPE).  SPE implies ‘applying resolution powers to the top of a 
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and cooperation on a multi-level approach is essential. As stated by the IMF in a 2012 
Global Financial Stability Report:  ‘good management by financial institutions with 
cross-border activities, well-coordinated supervision of cross-border institutions, and 
transparent methods of dealing with distress are all components of healthy financial 
globalization’.102  
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                           
group by a single national resolution authority’ (a system which suits the bank holding company 
structure that is ubiquitous in the USA) while MPE entails ‘applying resolution tools to different parts 
of the group by two or more resolution authorities acting in a coordinated way’ (a system which suits 
the structure of many cross-border banking establishments in the EU). See Federal Deposit Insurance 
Corporation (FDIC) and the Bank of England, Resolving Globally Active, Systemically Important, 
Financial Institutions: A joint paper by the FDIC and the BoE (2012). See also: FSB, Consultative 
Document on Recovery and Resolution Planning: Making the Key Attributes Requirements 
Operational (2013) available at: www.financialstabilityboard.org/publications/r_121102.pdf.  
102 IMF, Global Financial Stability Report Restoring Confidence and Progressing on Reforms, 
(October 2012), 112.  
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